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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT





M.R. METTERAU; C.R. STICKLER
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 06-cv-01047)
District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1
November 15, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and WEIS, Circuit Judges





Geoffrey Atwell, a former state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from several
orders of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania entered
in his civil rights action.  We will affirm.
In his complaint, Atwell alleged that two correctional officers took his legal papers
     Atwell was initially notified that his appeal from the order dismissing Gallagher as a1
party might be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  Although Atwell filed this appeal
before the District Court entered a final judgment, we have jurisdiction because the
appeal ripened upon the District Court’s adjudication of his remaining claims.  Cape May
Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1983).
2
and supplies, clothing, and television the day before he was released from prison.  Atwell
claimed that the officers violated his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, and conspired against him.  Atwell also claimed that a physician’s
assistant, Kelly Gallagher, failed to treat his medical condition.
Shortly after filing his complaint, Atwell moved for the recusal of Judge Rambo
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(a) and 455(b)(1).  Atwell alleged that Judge Rambo
was biased against him based upon her adverse rulings in civil rights actions he filed
when he was incarcerated, and the fact that this Court remanded some of his cases to the
District Court for further proceedings.  Atwell also stated that he had filed a complaint
against Judge Rambo, and that she had a conflict of interest because she was once a
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania employee. 
Judge Rambo denied the recusal motion, dismissed Gallagher from the action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and granted the correctional officers’ motion to dismiss the
complaint.  This appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Atwell’s motion for
recusal.  As recognized by Judge Rambo, opinions formed by a judge on the basis of
events occurring in the course of prior proceedings do not constitute a basis for a bias
     Although the District Court only referred to § 1915, we assume the dismissal was2
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).  
3
motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455(a) and 455(b)(1) unless they display a deep-seated
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.  Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1990).  As Atwell’s allegations do not show a deep-seated
antagonism, Judge Rambo did not err in denying Atwell’s request for recusal based upon
her rulings in his prior lawsuits, and the fact that some of those decisions were remanded
on appeal.  
We also agree that Judge Rambo’s employment as a Pennsylvania judge thirty
years ago, and the fact that Atwell filed a complaint against Judge Rambo, did not require
recusal.  Atwell disputes Judge Rambo’s statement that she did not know about his
complaint and attaches to his brief correspondence reflecting that in 2001 this Court
notified Judge Rambo that a complaint filed by Atwell was sent to the Judicial Council. 
But given that five years lapsed between the filing of that complaint and the recusal
motion in this case, and given that Judge Rambo does not recall the complaint, we find no
abuse of discretion in the denial of recusal.
The District Court also did not err in dismissing Gallagher as a party pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).   The District Court explained that it dismissed Atwell’s claim2
against Gallagher in another action pending before it and denied Atwell’s motion for
reconsideration.  The District Court stated that Atwell’s present claim constituted
     In Atwell’s other action, M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 03-cv-1728, he alleged in his amended3
complaint that Gallagher refused to treat his serious medical conditions and acted with
deliberate indifference and reckless disregard causing him fear for his life.  Gallagher
moved to dismiss the complaint because Atwell did not include any factual averments
identifying what she did that violated his constitutional rights, the time and place of the
alleged deprivation, or facts indicating a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to grant Gallagher’s
motion because the amended complaint failed to state her personal involvement in any
constitutional violation and failed to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim.  Atwell unsuccessfully filed a motion for reconsideration in which he stated that,
on July 22, 2002, he notified Gallagher that he would sue her.  He attached a medical
record of that date in which Gallagher noted that Atwell mentioned a lawsuit.  In Atwell’s
current complaint, he referred to a lack of treatment on July 22, 2002, and provided the
same medical record. 
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harassment.  Although a defendant usually must raise preclusion as an affirmative
defense, a court may sua sponte dismiss an action on this basis where the court is on
notice that it previously decided the issue presented.  See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S.
392, 412 (2000) (explaining that this result avoids the burden of twice defending an
action and unnecessary judicial waste).  Because the District Court previously adjudicated
Atwell’s claim based on Gallagher’s alleged failure to treat him, the District Court did not
err in dismissing Gallagher from this case where Atwell’s claim was based on the same
cause of action.3
And the District Court did not err in granting the correctional officers’ motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  As
the District Court recognized, Atwell was required to allege an actual injury in order to
state a First Amendment denial of access to courts claim based upon the taking of his
     The correctional officers did not move to dismiss, and the District Court did not4
adjudicate, Atwell’s due process claim.  But Atwell has waived any issues related to this
claim on appeal because he did not raise them in his brief.  United States v. Pelullo, 399
F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  To the extent Atwell refers to his due process claim in his
reply brief, his belated reference is insufficient to preserve the claim for review.  Kost v.
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993)
        5
legal papers.  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-54 (1996).  Although Atwell asserted
that his litigation efforts in several cases were impeded, the dockets for those cases reflect
that one case is still being litigated and the others could not have been affected by the
alleged taking of documents.  And Atwell only argues in his brief that he lost his research
notes.  Atwell was released from prison one day after the officers allegedly took the
documents, and he does not contend that he was unable to conduct legal research after his
release.  He has not alleged an actual injury resulting from the loss of his legal papers. 
The District Court also agreed with the correctional officers that Atwell did not
allege facts supporting a conspiracy claim, and that his allegations regarding the
deprivation of his property did not state an Eighth Amendment claim because he was not
deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.  We agree.  And Atwell’s
arguments that the correctional officers did not comply with the rules of civil procedure
do not warrant relief for the reasons stated by the District Court.   
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.4
